State v. Pendleton: Impermissible Delegations to Religious Institutions: Is Campbell University an Armed Church? by See, Stephen
Campbell Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 3 Summer 1996 Article 5
January 1996
State v. Pendleton: Impermissible Delegations to
Religious Institutions: Is Campbell University an
Armed Church?
Stephen See
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Stephen See, State v. Pendleton: Impermissible Delegations to Religious Institutions: Is Campbell University an Armed Church?, 18
Campbell L. Rev. 409 (1996).
STATE V. PENDLETON: IMPERMISSIBLE DELEGA-
TIONS TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS: IS CAMPBELL
UNIVERSITY AN ARMED CHURCH?
I. INTRODUCTION
State v. Pendleton1 is the North Carolina Supreme Court's
most recent attempt to apply the Establishment Clause in the
realm of higher education. On December 30, 1994, the Supreme
Court evaluated the constitutionality of permitting Campbell Uni-
versity, a church-affiliated school, to employ a campus police force
under Chapter 74A of the General Statutes of North Carolina2 .
Although divided,3 the Court ruled that the statute was unconsti-
tutional as it applied to Campbell University.4
This State's Supreme Court held that Campbell University is
a religious institution and its use of a police force entangled
church and state. As a result, Campbell's police force Was decom-
missioned and the University now pays the county Sheriffs
Department to patrol the campus. The Supreme Court used
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 5 as the controlling test for excessive
entanglement. Although this is arguably the controlling case, the
North Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of the case
appears to defy the logic of the United States Supreme Court in
Larkin. This note will review the North Carolina Supreme
Court's use and interpretation of Larkin and compare it with the
interpretation of Larkin by other courts in cases that specifically
follow Larkin.
II. THE CASE
The incident that brought this issue before the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court was a simple case of drinking and driving.
Alan Pendleton, an undergraduate student at Campbell Univer-
sity, was pulled over by campus police after weaving across the
1. 339 N.C. 379, 451 S.E.2d 274 (1994).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74A (1989) (repealed by 1991 N.C. SESS. LAwS ch. 1043,
§ 8 (effective 25 July 1992)).
3. Justices Meyer and Webb joined Justice Whichard in a dissenting opinion.
Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 391, 451 S.E.2d at 281.
4. State v. Pendleton, 339 N.C. 379, 451 S.E.2d 274 (1994).
5. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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centerline on his way toward campus. Pendleton was convicted
for driving while impaired 6 in Harnett County District Court. On
appeal in Superior Court, Pendleton unleashed his constitutional
defense to conviction for drinking and driving. He moved that the
case be dismissed because Chapter 74A of the General Statutes of
North Carolina, which gave authority to the campus police, vio-
lated the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States as well as provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina.7
Chapter 74A permitted the Attorney General of North Caro-
lina to commission employees of private institutions to function as
police officers.8 Pendleton argued that Campbell University is a
private, church-owned, religious institution, and therefore the
Constitution prohibits Campbell from employing personnel that
exercise the state's police power. The Superior Court found Chap-
ter 74A unconstitutional as applied because it created excessive
entanglement of church and state, it constituted an impermissible
delegation of authority to a religious institution, and it was an
establishment of religion.9 This holding was reversed by the
Court of Appeals and subsequently reinstated by the Supreme
Court.° The state decommissioned the University police force on
January 1, 1995.
III. THE BACKGROUND: FROM LEMOV TO LARCIN
The creation and application of a manageable standard with
which to maintain a constitutional relationship between church
and state has been a vexing question since the United States
Supreme Court first attempted to construe the establishment
6. Driving while impaired is a violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1 (1993).
7. Pendleton alleged that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74A (1989) violated Article I,
Section 13 of the Constitution of North Carolina as it applied to Campbell
University. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 383, 384, 451 S.E.2d at 277. This, however,
was not the focus of the case.
8. Chapter 74A was repealed after the order of the Superior Court and before
this case was heard before the Court of Appeals. 1991 N.C. SESS. LAws ch. 1043
§ 8 (effective 25 July 1992). However, this Chapter was in force at all times
relavent to this case, and its provisions are the focus of this case. The subject
matter of Chapter 74A is now contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74E (1992).
9. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 382, 491 S.E.2d at 276.
10. Id. at 383, 384, 451 S.E.2d at 277.
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clause. 1 From 1963 to 1971, the Supreme Court experimented
with two elemental tests.12
In 1971, the Court reformulated its test in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.13 According to the Lemon test, for a statute to be found con-
stitutional: (1) it must have a secular purpose, (2) its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, and (3) the statute must not foster "an excessive government
entanglement with religion." 4 If a statute lacks any one of these
prongs it is unconstitutional.15 Although this case has been criti-
cized and the Lemon test has yielded inconsistent results 16 it
remains the controlling test.' 7
In 1982, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 18 appeared to supply a
clear example of "excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion." Larkin involved a Massachusetts statute that vested in the
governing bodies of churches or schools the power to deny applica-
tions for liquor licenses within 500 feet of the school or church.
The statute was invalidated when a restaurant challenged the
denial of its application for such a license by a local church.19 The
Supreme Court stated that "the Framers did not set up a system
of government in which important, discretionary governmental
powers would be delegated to or shared with religious institu-
11. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the United States
Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey statute providing reimbursement of
transportation expenses to parents who sent their children to private schools
even where the children attended religious schools. Despite the holding, the
Court stated that the "wall of separation" must be "high and impregnable." Id. at
18.
12. In School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), the
Court stated that a law would pass constitutional scrutiny if it (1) has a secular
purpose and (2) has the effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion. In
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970), the Court stated that a law
would not violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) has a secular purpose
and (2) does not create excessive entanglements of government with religion.
13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
14. Id. at 612-13.
15. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987).
16. For a review of the United States Supreme Court's use of the Lemon Test
to determine statutory violations of the Establishment Clause, see Stuart W.
Bowen, Jr., Is Lemon A Lemon? Crosscurrents in Contemporary Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129 (1990). For a review of criticism of
the Lemon test, see Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 384, 451 S.E.2d at 277.
17. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
18. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
19. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117.
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tions."20 Larkin's delegation analysis has been closely followed by
four cases. 2 '
IV. THE RATIONALE
The North Carolina Supreme Court based its ruling entirely
on federal constitutional grounds, and did not address North Car-
olina state constitutional violations.22 The Court looked to Lemon
v. Kurtzman ,23 to begin its analysis to determine whether a stat-
ute violates the Establishment Clause. The only prong at issue in
the Court's review of Chapter 74A was the third-whether the
statute fosters "an excessive government entanglement with
religion. 24
The Supreme Court then looked to Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc. 25 for a definition of "excessive government entanglement with
religion." The majority interpreted Larkin as creating a two part
test.26 According to the majority, an excessive entanglement was
20. Id. at 126.
21. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 129 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1994) (holding unconstitutional a statute creating a
special school district following village lines of a religious enclave incorporated as
a village to exclude all but its practitioners); United Christian Scientists v.
Christian Science Bd. of Directors, First Church of Christ, Scientist 829 F.2d
1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding unconstitutional a private copywrite law granting
a religious denomination extended copyright on all editions of a religious text);
Spacco v. Bridgewater Sch. Dep't, 722 F. Supp. 834 (D. Mass. 1989) (allowing a
preliminary injunction requiring reassignment of public school children assigned
to attend classes in a facility leased from a Roman Catholic Church); Farris v.
Minit Mart Foods, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1985) (holding unconstitutional a
statute stating that no license for sale of alcohol will be granted within 200 yards
of a church or school if the governing authority of the church or school objects).
Spacco v. Bridgewater School Dept., 739 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1990) (approving
a proposed settlement enjoining the school district from leasing the facility of the
Roman Catholic Church for three years).
22. The question of state constitutional violations was deemed "unnecessary
and dilatory" by the Pendleton court because to the majority the violation of the
United States Constitution was clear. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 383, 451 S.E.2d at
277.
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 384, 451 S.E.2d at 277.
25. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
26. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 386, 451 S.E.2d at 278.
[Vol. 18:409412
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created whenever a delegation of important discretionary govern-
mental power is made to a religious institution.27
The Court concluded the first element was met because the
Supreme Court of the United States has already stated that the
police power calls for a high degree of judgment and discretion.28
The Court then used Lemon and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
Sch. Dist. 29 to further define the term "religious institution." In
Lemon, the constitutional challenge regarded state funding assist-
ance to Catholic primary and secondary schools. The findings of
fact indicate that: the schools integrated faith and morals into the
curriculum, specific religious instruction was given 30 minutes a
day, and approximately two-thirds of the faculty consisted of
nuns. 30
The Court concluded that the schools were controlled by reli-
gious organizations and that a substantial purpose of the school
was propagating and promoting a religious faith.31 Thus the
schools were incompatible with the statutory scheme for public
funding.32
In Zobrest, the Supreme Court held that the Establishment
Clause did not prevent a school district from supplying an inter-
preter under the Individuals with Disabilities Act for a deaf stu-
dent that attended a Catholic high school.33 In Zobrest the Court
defined a sectarian institution as "one in which the two functions
of secular education and advancement of religious values or
beliefs are inextricably intertwined."3 4 This statement, however,
was not defined in terms of specific findings of fact, as it was a
stipulation of both parties. 35
The findings of fact used by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Pendleton included: Campbell is a Baptist university, its
property was deeded to the Baptist State Convention, students
take a required religion course, the North Carolina Baptist State
Convention elects trustees, and the University catalog contains a
27. The dissent viewed this case as requiring a third element in the test: the
religious institution's exercise of that power must fuse religious and
governmental functions. Id. at 391, 451 S.E.2d at 282 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
28. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
29. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
30. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 618.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Zobrest, 113 S.Ct. at 2469.
34. Id. at 2464 n.1.
35. Id.
1996] 413
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religious commitment. 36 The Court then concluded that Campbell
University is a "'religious institution' within the meaning of the
Supreme Court of the United States in its decision in Larkin."7
The North Carolina Supreme Court, finding both prongs of the
Larkin analysis satisfied, held N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74A (1989)
unconstitutional as applied. 8
V. THE ANALYSIS
The holding of the North Carolina Supreme Court rests
squarely on a comparison of Pendleton and Larkin. This note will
analyze this comparison by reviewing the factors of Larkin and its
following cases that were deemed to create an "unconstitutional
delegation to a religious institution." This note will first consider
the definition of "religious institution," and second what consti-
tutes "delegation" according to these cases. This note will then
review the facts of Pendleton and compare them with those of
other "delegation cases" and make a conclusion as to whether
Chapter 74A created an impermissible delegation as it applied to
Campbell. This note will focus exclusively on the "delegation
cases." Other lines of cases dealing with the Establishment
Clause are beyond the scope of this note.
A. What Is a "Religious Institution" Under Larkin?
The religious institution involved in Larkin was a church, in
the traditional sense of the word. The statute under review in
that case defined church as "a church or synagogue building dedi-
cated to divine worship."39 The Supreme Court interpreted the
definition to mean: "any building primarily used as a place of
assembly by a bona fide religious group."40 The Supreme Court
later referred to the entity in Larkin as a "formally constituted
parish council" that was "an institution of religious govern-
36. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 386-89, 451 S.E.2d at 279-80.
37. Id. at 389, 451 S.E.2d at 280.
38. Id. at 390, 451 S.E.2d at 281.
39. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 121 n.3.
40. Id.
414 [Vol. 18:409
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/5
IMPERMISSIBLE DELEGATIONS
ment."'" A church was also the religious institution in a virtually
identical statute reviewed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.42
A traditional church is also the institution involved in Spacco
v. Bridgewater Sch. Dep't,4" a First Circuit case out of Massachu-
setts, that is instructive in its treatment of Larkin. In Spacco, the
constitutionality of a public school leasing classroom space from a
Roman Catholic Church was challenged. The plaintiffs, students
at the public school, sought a preliminary injunction requiring
their reassignment from classes held in the leased classrooms.
After a determination of probable success on the merits, the court
granted the injunction. The terms of the lease that give the
church the ability to terminate the lease if the use of the class-
rooms was not consistent with the teachings of the Roman Catho-
lic Church. 4 The court concluded this may give the church
influence over the curriculum and was the functional equivalent of
the delegation of the authority in Larkin .45 Here again, the "reli-
gious institution" is a church in the traditional sense of the word.
The definition of religious institution also includes the leader-
ship of a religious denomination. In United Christian Scientists v.
Christian Science Bd. of Directors, First Church of Christ, Scien-
tist,46 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held unconstitutional a copyright granted to the First
Church of Christ Scientist for Science and Health, the religious
text of Christian Scientists. The 1971 copyright granted the
church exclusive rights to all extant editions of the work until
2046, and provided that subsequently published editions were to
be protected for 75 years.47 When United Christian Scientists,
another sect of Christian scientists, challenged the copyright, the
court held that the law was an impermissible delegation under
481Larkin.
41. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 2488 (1994).
42. Farris v. Minit Mart Foods, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1985). The
Supreme Court of Kentucky follows the reasoning of Larkin so closely that
separate analysis of this case is unnecessary.
43. 722 F. Supp. 834 (D. Mass. 1989).
44. Id. at 845.
45. Id. at 844.
46. 829 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 1157.
48. Id. at 1170.
1996] 415
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In Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet,49 the Court expanded the definition of religious institu-
tion in the context of government delegations of power. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that a New York statute unconstitu-
tionally delegated state authority to the school board of an exclu-
sively Hasidic school district. The district had been drawn
specifically for the purpose of creating an exclusively Hasidic
neighborhood. 50 The statute granted the elected school board ple-
nary authority over primary and secondary schools in the district.
The Court stated that the delegation of authority over public
schools "to a group defined by its character as a religious commu-
nity" was prohibited. 51 The Supreme Court then stated that
Larkin "teaches that a State may not delegate its civic authority
to a group chosen according to a religious criterion."52
B. Does Larkin's Definition of "Religious Institution" Include
the "Pervasively Sectarian" Standard?
Since Lemon, a line of cases has developed that addresses the
constitutional issues involved in public funding for private, relig-
iously affiliated organizations.53 The Supreme Court has held
that religious affiliation does not disqualify a religious organiza-
tion from participation in state statutory programs. 54 Participa-
tion by religiously affiliated organizations in public financial
programs creates excessive entanglement under two circum-
stances: (1) where the program involves a "specifically religious
activity" or (2) where the institution is "pervasively sectarian."55
The Supreme Court of North Carolina used Lemon and
Zobrest in its analysis of Campbell University's status as a reli-
49. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
50. Id. at 2485.
51. Id. at 2487.
52. Id. at 2488.
53. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding a
grant program for private colleges where the funding is used for secular
purposes); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding a state bond program
for private college construction as long as the school is not pervasively sectarian);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding grants to universities so
long as religion did not permeate schools).
54. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609, (1988) (upholding a grant to a
religiously affiliated organization to fund studies of pre-marital sexual relations
and pregnancy under the Adolescent Family Life Act).
55. Id. at 617-18.
416 [Vol. 18:409
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gious institution. Both cases involve direct or indirect state aid.56
The application of state aid cases, to Pendleton, where no state aid
is involved, is questionable. It is not certain the United States
Supreme Court intends the "pervasively sectarian" standard to be
used to determine whether an institution is a religious institu-
tions in a delegation analysis.5 7 An exhaustive review of holdings
under the "pervasively sectarian" standard is beyond the scope of
this note.
C. What Delegations of State Authority are Prohibited by
Larkin?
In Larkin, the Supreme Court appears to give four distinct
reasons why the statute's delegation of authority was unconstitu-
tional: (1) the church would be able to exercise the state's power
without any standards, (2) there would be no guarantee as to neu-
tral application by the church, (3) the statute could create political
divisiveness concerning religion, and (4) the statute could create a
symbolic benefit to religion.58
The Supreme Court stated in Larkin that the invalidated
statute "substitutes the unilateral and absolute power of a church
56. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2662 (1993) (holding
constitutional the placement of an interpreter in a catholic high school under the
Individuals With Disabilities Act); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(invalidating two statutes: one that allowed reimbursement to private schools
for the purchase of educational materials for certain secular courses, the other
authorized state supplementation of salaries for teachers of secular subjects in
private, church-affiliated schools).
57. If this standard did apply then both Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973),
and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), would be instructive.
In Hunt v. McNair, a Baptist college was held not to be pervasively
sectarian. 413 U.S. at 743-44. The South Carolina Baptist Convention elected
the College's trustees and held the sole power to amend the College charter and
approve financial arrangements. However, students and faculty did not have to
meet religious qualifications for admission or hiring. Although the charter
contained religious rhetoric, the court found its operation was not oriented
toward sectarian over secular. Id.
Similarly in Tilton v. Richardson four universities were found not to be
pervasively sectarian. 403 U.S. at 686-87. The universities were run by catholic
religious organizations and dominated by Catholic faculty and students.
However, the universities employed non-Catholics, and no attendance at
religious services was required. Theology courses were required but they not
limited to Catholic theology. The Supreme Court held that their predominant
mission was secular education. Id. These schools bear a strong resemblance to
Campbell University.
58. 459 U.S. at 124.
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for the reasoned decision making of a public legislative body act-
ing on evidence and guided by standards, on issues with signifi-
cant economic and political implications."59 The Court later
stated that "the churches' power under the statute is standar-
dless, calling for no reasons, findings, or reasoned conclusions."6 °
Thelack of standards leads to the concern that the power may
be used by churches to promote its own goals because the statute
"does not by its terms require that churches' power be used in a
religiously neutral way."61 The Court believed that the church
could use its veto to override the licenses of non-church members
and therefore use governmental power to discriminate on the
basis of religion. 62 This in turn would create "the danger of polit-
ical fragmentation and divisiveness along religious lines."63
Although the point went virtually undiscussed, the Court stated
that resulting appearance of a joint exercise of legislative author-
ity by church and state that would, in the minds of some, provide a
symbolic benefit to religion.64
The concerns in Larkin are re-iterated in United Christian
Scientists. The copyright at issue in the case effectively gave the
First Church of Christ the authority to veto any and all publica-
tions of the major doctrinal work in the Christian Scientist faith.65
Thus there was no means of guaranteeing that the delegated
power would be used for nonideological purposes.66
The "fusion" in Spacco resulted from a lease of a church facil-
ity by a public school. The court held that this relationship cre-
ated a "sharing of the town's power and responsibility concerning
what is taught to its elementary school students."6 7
The Circuit Court raised three concerns also raised in Larkin.
First, the court stated that there was no guarantee that the gov-
ernmental power would be exercised neutrally.68 Because the
church could terminate the lease if the use of the classroom was
inconsistent with the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church,
59. Id. at 128.
60. Id. at 125.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.
64. Id. at 124.
65. United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, First
Church of Christ, Scientist, 829 F.2d 1152, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
66. Id.
67. Spacco, 722 F. Supp. at 846.
68. Id.
418 [Vol. 18:409
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the court feared that the school would avoid teaching matters to
which the church might object. 69 In addition, it appeared that the
school deferred to the church's judgment concerning which reli-
gious symbols should be removed from the children's sight.
70
Second, the court stated that the relationship created political
divisiveness along religious lines.71 Since the suit was brought,
the plaintiffs and their faith became subjects of ridicule in phone
calls, letters, and local newspaper columns. 72
Finally, the court stated that the relationship was unaccept-
able because it created the appearance of joint exercise of author-
ity by church and state.73 The court specifically noted that
religious symbols and messages were highly visible to the children
as they entered the building for classes. 4 On several occasions a
priest greeted the students at the door. 75 This was of great con-
cern because the children involved were "impressionable, young
children."76
In Grumet, the Supreme Court indicated that the statute in
question created a "fusion" because there was no means of guaran-
teeing that the "governmental power will be and has been neu-
trally employed." 77 The Supreme Court held the statute was
invalid because it effectively identified recipients of governmental
authority by reference to "doctrinal adherence."78 Although the
statute itself did not identify a religious group, the district to
which it applied was created on purely religious grounds. 79 The
statute created a "purposeful delegation on the basis of religion. "80
D. Is Campbell a Religious Institution Under Larkin?
Campbell University is an educational institution directed by
an independent Board of Trustees. Although trustees are elected
by the Baptist State Convention, no church has authority over the
69. Id. at 845.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 847.
72. Spacco, 722 F. Supp. at 847.
73. Id. at 842.
74. Id. at 842.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 841.
77. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491.
78. Id. at 2489.
79. Id. at 2488.
80. Id.
1996] 419
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Board.81 The responsibilities of the board are confined to the oper-
ations and funding of the University, and have no other religious
mission.82 The curriculum of Campbell University is much like
that of other universities, and is not focused on religious
education. 8
As a university, Campbell University is made up of students
and faculty of many different faiths. There are no religious crite-
ria associated with admissions or hiring.
Campbell University is not a church in the traditional sense
of the word as in Larkin and Spacco or the governing body of a
religious denomination as in United Christian Scientists. Camp-
bell University is not a religious community in the context of
Grumet.
E. Is Chapter 74A a Delegation Under Larkin?
Based on the above cases, the courts raise the following con-
cerns about delegation of power to a religious institution: (1) abso-
lute power or lack of standards might be exercised by a religious
institution, (2) political fragmentation on religious lines might
result, (3) the delegation itself could be made on the basis of reli-
gion, (4) the delegation could create the appearance of joint
authority of church and state. Each of these will be discussed in
relation to the facts of Pendleton.
1. Absolute Power or Lack of Standards
The delegation of authority to Campbell University police
under Chapter 74A allows the police to make arrests for felonies
and misdemeanors and charge for traffic infractions.84 The
enforcement of state law cannot be said to be without standards.
The statutes and the United States Constitution operate as stan-
dards for proper law enforcement. Similarly, the authority of
Campbell University or its police force cannot be said to be abso-
lute. Judges, magistrates, and juries are designed to inject dis-
passionate reason into criminal prosecution. This system is
designed to prevent arbitrary and absolute exercise of police
authority. These standards distinguish Pendleton from Larkin
and United Christian Scientists.
81. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 392, 451 S.E.2d at 282.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 393, 451 S.E.2d at 283.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74A-2(b) (1989) (repealed by 1991 N.C. SESS. LAws ch.
1043, § 8 (effective 25 July 1992)).
420 [Vol. 18:409
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2. Political Fragmentation on Religious Lines
Prosecution of criminal law to reduce drug abuse, reckless
driving, or drunk and disorderly conduct is rarely divisive along
religious lines. In Larkin, a church was given veto power over the
operation of a liquor store. Alcohol is something many church
denominations have taken a stand against. In Spacco, the statute
caused religious tension between the plaintiffs, an agnostic and a
Hindu, and members of the majority Catholic town.8 5 In the
absence of unusual University policies like warning speeders that
have been baptized and ticketing speeders that have not been bap-
tized, it is hard to imagine any division on religious lines as a
result of Chapter 74A as occurred in Larkin, or Spacco. The dis-
sent indicated that such activities did not occur.8 6
3. Purposeful Delegation on the Basis of Religion
Former Chapter 74A provided that:
any educational institution or hospital, whether State or Private,
or any other state institution, public utility company, construction
company, manufacturing company, auction company, . . . may
apply to the Attorney General to commission such persons ... to
act as policemen for it. 7
Campbell applied as only one of a large group eligible for applica-
tion under the statute. Unlike Grumet, the delegation was not
made on the basis of religion in Pendleton.
4. Appearance of Joint Authority of Church and State
Under former Chapter 74A, Campbell University, a church
affiliated school, employs individuals that "possess all the powers
of municipal and county police."88 On this basis, one could argue
that the use of state authority by employees of a religiously affili-
ated school could create an impression in the minds of some that
the state endorses that religion.
However, one major concern raised in Spacco, the only case
that analyzed the appearance of joint authority, is not present in
Pendleton. Because students at Campbell are college age and
older, the risks of symbolic union are significantly different than
85. Spacco, 722 F. Supp. at 846.
86. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 395, 451 S.E.2d at 284.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74A-1 (1989) (repealed by 1991 N.C. SEss. LAws ch.
1043, § 8 (effective 25 July 1992)).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74A-2(b) (1989) (repealed by 1991 N.C. SEss. LAws ch.
1043, § 8 (effective 25 July 1992)).
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with the impressionable young elementary school students in
Spacco .89
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that relig-
iously affiliated organizations are not barred from participation in
statutory schemes that are not religious in character and are
available to a wide spectrum of organizations. 90 In such cases the
Supreme Court stated that there is no impermissible advancing of
religion. 91
According to the dissenting justices of the North Carolina
Supreme Court, there is no evidence that Campbell's police
proselytized students, visitors, or faculty or acted in a religious
manner or for a religious purpose in the exercise of their duties.92
Further, unlike each of the delegation cases mentioned above,
Chapter 74A is available to a large group of organizations. 93
Under the delegation cases, and prior establishment clause juris-
prudence, Chapter 74A does not appear to create an advancement
of religion through symbolic union.
VI. CONCLUSION
Campbell is a Baptist-affiliated university that employed a
campus police force under state law. The North Carolina
Supreme Court held the arrangement unconstitutional based on
Larkin. The Court concluded that Campbell University is a "'reli-
gious institution' within the meaning of the Supreme Court of the
United States in its decision in Larkin."94 However, Larkin, and
all of the delegation cases following it involve a "religious institu-
tion" that is a church, a religious community, or the leadership of
a religious denomination. Campbell University does not fit in
these categories.
The Court concluded that Chapter 74A was a delegation
within the meaning of Larkin because police power calls for a high
degree of judgment and discretion. 95 However, Larkin and all of
the delegation cases following it involve a delegation of a different
kind. The delegations struck down by the United States Supreme
89. Spacco, 722 F. Supp at 841.
90. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608-10 (1988).
91. Id.
92. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 395, 451 S.E.2d at 284.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74A-1 (1989) (repealed by 1991 N.C. SESS. LAws ch.
1043, § 8 (effective 25 July 1992)).
94. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 389, 451 S.E.2d at 280.
95. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
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IMPERMISSIBLE DELEGATIONS
Court were (1) delegations of absolute power that could be exer-
cised without standards, (2) delegations that were made on the
basis of religion, or (3) delegations that could cause either political
fragmentation on religious lines, or an advancement of religion by
the appearance of joint authority of church and state. None of
these describes the effect of Chapter 74A as it applied to Campbell
University.
The delegation of state power to a church that Larkin holds to
be violative of the Establishment Clause is simply not present in
Pendleton. As pointed out by the dissent in Pendleton, Larkin is
distinguishable and State v. Pendleton warranted a different out-
come. 96 Nevertheless, the North Carolina Supreme Court fol-
lowed Larkin, apparently finding that Campbell University was a
church exercising state authority by directing its own police force
under Chapter 74A.
Stephen See
96. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 396, 451 S.E.2d at 284.
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